Remarks by President George W. Bush at the National Dinner Celebrating 350 Years of Jewish Life in America.

A national dinner, marking the conclusion of the year-long celebration of the 350th anniversary of Jewish settlement in North America, was held on September 14, 2005, at the National Building Museum in Washington, DC. The dinner was jointly sponsored by the American Jewish Historical Society, the Jacob Rader Marcus Center of the American Jewish Archives, and Celebrate 350, the organization that coordinated the year of anniversary activities. The following remarks were made by President George W. Bush after receiving a commemorative anniversary medal from Robert S. Rifkind, chairman of Celebrate 350. Thank you all very much. Thanks for the warm welcome. Thanks for the invitation to be here. My only regret is Laura is not with me--I left her behind to do some diplomacy in New York City. Bob, I want to thank you for your kind introduction. I'm honored to accept this medal commemorating three and a half centuries of Jewish life in America. I consider it a high honor to have been invited to celebrate with you. Back in 1790, the Jewish congregation of Newport, Rhode Island, wrote to congratulate George Washington on his election as the country's first President. Some say he was the first George W. In his reply, President Washington thanked the congregation and pledged to defend vigorously the principle of religious liberty for all. Here's what he said. He said, the United States "gives [to] bigotry no sanction; to persecution, no assistance." And he expressed his hope that the "stock of Abraham" would thrive in America. In the centuries that followed, the stock of Abraham has thrived here like nowhere else. We're better and stronger, and we're a better and stronger and freer nation because so many Jews from countries all over the world have chosen to become American citizens. I want to thank Rabbi Gary Zola, who is the Chairman of the Commission for Commemorating 350 Years of American Jewish History. I want to thank Ken Bialkin, who is the Chairman of the Board of the American Jewish Historical Society. I want to thank members of Congress who are here. I want to thank members of the Diplomatic Corps, especially the Ambassador from Israel, Danny Ayalon. I want to thank two members of my Cabinet who've joined us--Secretary Alphonso Jackson, of the Department of Housing and Urban Affairs, and his wife Marcia, and Josh Bolten, who is the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. I appreciate the Archivist of the United States who has joined us today, Allen Weinstein; Dr. Jim Billington, who is the Librarian of Congress. I can't help but notice and welcome Ed Koch, the former mayor of New York City. I want to thank my friend, Fred Zeidman, from Houston, Texas, who's the Chairman of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Council. I want to pay my respects to Lynn Schusterman, who's the President of the Charles and Lynn Schusterman Family Foundation. And Sid Lapidus, who's the President of the American Jewish Historical Society. This may sound a little odd for a Methodist from Texas saying this, but I just came from shul. I was just given the grand tour of the great American landmark, the 6th and I Historic Synagogue. I want to thank Shelton Zuckerman and Abe Pollin for taking it upon themselves to restore this important historical structure. If you haven't been there, you ought to go. It is a--there's a wonderfully warm feeling. I saw the devotion that has gone into restoring this jewel, which was built nearly a century ago--a jewel that houses three Torah scrolls rescued from the Holocaust. We're proud to have this great synagogue in the heart of our Nation's Capital, and we're glad a new generation is revitalizing this house of God. The story of the Jewish people in America is a story of America, itself. The pilgrims considered this nation a new Israel, a refuge from persecution in Europe. Early Americans named many of their cities after places in Hebrew Scripture: Bethel and New Canaan, Shiloh and Salem. And when the first Jews arrived here, the children of Israel saw America as the land of promise, a golden land where they could practice their faith in freedom and live in liberty. When the first Jewish settlers came to our shores 350 years ago, they were not immediately welcomed. Yet, from the onset, the Jews who arrived here demonstrated a deep commitment to their new land. An immigrant named Asser Levy volunteered to serve in the New Amsterdam Citizens Guard, which, unfortunately, had a policy of refusing to admit Jews. That didn't bother Levy. He was determined, like many others who have followed him, to break down the barriers of discrimination. Within two years, he took his rightful spot alongside his fellow citizens in the Guard. He was the first of many Jewish Americans who have proudly worn the uniform of the United States. And one of the greatest Jewish soldiers America has ever known is Tibor Rubin. After surviving the Holocaust and the Nazi death camp, this young man came to America. He enlisted in the United States Army and fought in the Korean War. He was severely wounded and was later captured by the enemy. For two-and-a-half years, he survived in a POW camp. He risked his life for his fellow soldiers nearly every night by smuggling extra food for those who were ill--it was a skill he had learned in the Nazi camps--and because of his daring, as many as 40 American lives were saved. This evening, I'm happy to announce that next week, I will bestow upon this great patriot our nation's highest award for bravery, the Medal of Honor. Jewish Americans have made countless contributions to our land. The prophet, Jeremiah, once called out to this--to his nation, "Seek the welfare of the city where I have sent you into exile, and pray to the Lord on its behalf." For 350 years, American Jews have heeded these words, and you've prayed and worked for peace and freedom in America. Freedom to worship is why Jews came to America three-and-a-half centuries ago; it's why the Jews settled in Israel over five decades ago. Our two nations have a lot in common, when you think about it. We were both founded by immigrants escaping religious persecution in other lands. We both have built vibrant democracies. Both our countries are founded on certain basic beliefs, that there is an Almighty God who watches over the affairs of men and values every life. These ties have made us natural allies, and these ties will never be broken. Earlier today, I met in New York with Prime Minister Sharon and the Ambassador. I admire Prime Minister Sharon. He's a man of courage; he's a man of peace. Once again, I expressed this nation's commitment to defending the security and well-being of Israel. I also assured him that I will not waver when it comes to spreading freedom around the world. I understand this, that freedom is not America's gift to the world; freedom is an Almighty God's gift to each man and woman and child in this world. Religious freedom is a foundation of fundamental human and civil rights. And when the United States promotes religious freedom, it is promoting the spread of democracy. And when we promote the spread of democracy, we are promoting the cause of peace. Religious freedom is more than the freedom to practice one's faith. It is also the obligation to respect the faith of others. So to stand for religious freedom, we must expose and confront the ancient hatred of anti-Semitism, wherever it is found. When we find anti-Semitism at home, we will confront it. When we find anti-Semitism abroad, we will condemn it. And we condemn the desecration of synagogues in Gaza that followed Israel's withdrawal. Under America's system of religious freedom, church and state are separate. Still, we have learned that faith is not solely a private matter. Men and women throughout our history have acted on the words of Scripture and they have made America a better, more hopeful place. When Rabbi Abraham Heschel marched with Martin Luther King, we saw modern-day prophets calling on America to honor its promises. We must allow people of faith to act on their convictions without facing discrimination. And that's why my administration has started a faith-based and community initiative, to call on the armies of compassion to help heal broken hearts. A few years ago in New York, the Metropolitan Council on Jewish Poverty was discouraged from even applying for federal funds because it had the word "Jewish" in its name. We must end this kind of discrimination if we want America to be a hopeful place. At this moment, volunteers from all walks of life, across our great land, are helping the good folks of Alabama and Mississippi and Louisiana recover from one of the worst natural disasters in our nation's history. The outpouring of compassion is phenomenal. American Jewish organizations have already raised over $10 million, plus the $50,000 tonight, for the victims of Hurricane Katrina. About half of the 10,000 Jewish Americans who call New Orleans home found refuge in Houston. Rabbi Barry Gelman of the United Orthodox Synagogues of Houston, immediately helped organize a task force to aid the evacuees. Five major Israeli universities with study abroad programs are opening their doors to college students whose schools have been shut down by the storm. These are the good works of good people relying on the wisdom of the Good Book, a book that tells us how God rescued life from the flood waters. And like Noah and his family, we have faith that as the waters recede, we will see life begin again. I want to thank you for your patriotism. I want to thank you for compassion. I want to thank you for your love for the United States of America. All of America is grateful to the Jewish people for the treasures you have given us over the past 350 years. May God bless you, and may God continue to bless our country.

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Publication Information: Article Title: Remarks by President George W. Bush at the National Dinner Celebrating 350 Years of Jewish Life in America. Journal Title: American Jewish History. Volume: 93. Issue: 1. Publication Year: 2007. Page Number: 73+. COPYRIGHT 2007 American Jewish Historical Society; COPYRIGHT 2007 Gale Group

Command of Office: How War, Secrecy, and Deception Transformed the Presidency from Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Bush.

by Russell L. Riley Command of Office: How War, Secrecy, and Deception Transformed the Presidency, from Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Bush. By Stephen Graubard. New York: Basic Books, 2004. 722 pp. "Don't judge a book by its cover" remains sage advice for anyone contemplating Stephen Graubard's Command of Office. The book's prominently displayed subtitle, as well as a dust jacket promising a "sharply focused narrative" about "a dangerous transformation of the executive branch in the last one hundred years," ill prepares the reader for what in fact follows. This is not the book it purports to be--although there is some value in what it actually is. Graubard proposes at the outset a timely, if not particularly original, thesis: war has changed the character of the American presidency. Especially intriguing is the related claim that the presidency entered a new age with Theodore Roosevelt. The subsequent century (again according to the jacket language) saw

 three different "presidencies" emerge, each marked by increasing
accumulation of authority: the presidency created by TR, Wilson,
and FDR, continued under Truman and Eisenhower, in which foreign
policy issues played a far greater role in presidential politics;
the period of America's time of troubles that began with Kennedy
and ended with Carter, in which the disastrous Vietnam war spurred
a further tendency to secrecy; and the third presidency, defined
by Reagan and perfected by Clinton and both Bushes, in which the
presidents consciously playact their role for the public.

This is, to say the least, a creative form of periodicity that ought to pique the interest of any student of American politics. The core problem of the book, however, is the absence of a sustained effort to make the case for these claims. There are occasional assertions throughout of war's impact on the presidency, generally along well-established terrain. Yet the nature of the alleged institutional transformation never gets treated in a concentrated way, and the assertion of three "great divides" (p. xii) in the twentieth century presidency is all but abandoned in the subsequent text. Moreover, although Command of Office does maintain a very loose focus on the subject of foreign affairs, the undisciplined inclusion of unrelated matter impairs the reader's sight lines--and Graubard fails to illuminate a clear trail through the thicket. Two of the earliest chapters, for example, one on vice-presidential accession and the other on the democratization of the presidential selection process, have nothing material to do with the main topic. Thus, the strains of a coherent argument about war and presidential transformation are lost in the volume's over-700 pages. The great bulk of the book comprises eighteen chapters, one devoted to each president from the elder Roosevelt to the younger Bush. This is where Graubard is at his best--and indeed an astute publisher would have recast Command of Office to emphasize the rich, idiosyncratic character of these miniature biographies. The author relies almost exclusively on secondary sources in crafting these chapters, but he brings to his assessments a distinctive, highly opinionated style. These pages depict presidential history through the eyes of a provocative critic. The chapter on Woodrow Wilson is probably the finest, although Graubard's evident favorites are Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman. Roosevelt was a "gifted and intelligent man, well-read and well-spoken ... [who] showed a command of foreign policy issues ... greater than that of almost anyone who had preceded him in the White House, and that few of his successors were able to rival" (p. 100). Truman's "was the most creative presidency of the post-World War II period," because of the international architecture that he and his lieutenants wrought (p. 282). Graubard seems much more comfortable, however, in the role of scold. Eisenhower is "a five-star general out of his depth in the White House" (p. 320). Kennedy "imagined he understood foreign policy and that those he chose to assist and advise him were exceptionally able" (p. 348). Of Jimmy Carter's hopes that the Iranian hostages might be released on his watch, thereby granting some historical absolution, the author writes, "This was self-deception, innocence, and arrogance by a president who claimed only to be modest and virtuous" (p. 438). And of the two most recent presidents, Clinton and George W. Bush, the tone is almost unremittingly harsh. There is no hint of partisan bias in these critiques--Republicans and Democrats alike are subjected to a sometimes acid pen. Although the book's principal flaw is a lack of fidelity to its proposed theory, it also suffers from more than occasional errors in fact. That Hingham, Massachusetts is not, as Graubard has it, on Cape Cod (p. 77) is a trivial mistake. Less so, California (voting for John Nance Garner in the 1932 Democratic primary) was not then the third largest state in the nation (p. 56), and James A. Baker was never Gerald Ford's White House chief of staff (p. 423). Inexplicably, Graubard's account of the Monica Lewinsky scandal gets the U.S. Supreme Court's crucial decision in Clinton v. Jones exactly wrong--writing that the Court ruled against allowing Paula Jones to proceed with her lawsuit while the president served out his term (p. 527). This is a remarkable error, not just because of the prominence of the holding, but because the entire history of the Clinton presidency would have changed had the Court ruled as Graubard describes. Moreover, it is instructive that in Jones the Court reversed its closest precedent, in which Richard Nixon was allowed by the Burger Court to avoid a civil suit because at that time the commander in chief's responsibilities were deemed too important to permit any distractions. In the relatively peaceful interlude between the flail of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the World Trade Center, the Rehnquist Court saw the president's job in a different light. Nuances in this sequence of events suggest that war's influence on the American presidency may be substantially more complex than the claims offered in Command of Office. Russell L. Riley University of Virginia

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Publication Information: Article Title: Command of Office: How War, Secrecy, and Deception Transformed the Presidency from Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Contributors: Russell L. Riley - author. Journal Title: Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume: 35. Issue: 3. Publication Year: 2005. Page Number: 613+. COPYRIGHT 2005 Center for the Study of the Presidency; COPYRIGHT 2005 Gale Group

Chronic Politics: Health Care Security from FDR to George W. Bush.

by Craig Ramsay

Chronic Politics: Health Care Security from FDR to George W. Bush. By Philip J. Funigiello. (Lawrence, Kans.: University Press of Kansas, 2005. Pp. x, 395. $39.95.)

Implacable opposition from effective interest groups, a government system with separation of powers, a fragmented Congressional legislative process, undisciplined political parties, and a political culture rooted in individualistic, antigovernment attitudes are the familiar factors at the heart of this author's retelling of one of the most prominent U.S. public policy-making sagas. Phillip J. Funigiello clearly regrets the failure to achieve universal, comprehensive health care coverage because of its important role in his conception of social justice. He occasionally lets out a polemical point but by and large avoids moralizing in favor of a well-crafted, detailed chronological account. At the end of each chapter, he includes an interpretive summary of that chapter, including tying in the past and future. The pre-New Deal phase of the story beginning in the Progressive Era [1890-1920] in the states is only briefly touched on in favor of focusing on the evolution of the federal government's role from the 1930s through the Bush administration's Medicare prescription drug legislation.

This policy area is complex and important enough to warrant an updated book-length history now and then. Funigiello's willingness to look afresh at the primary and secondary sources and his ability to write in a clear, compelling fashion about fascinating personalities and events distinguish his descriptive analysis. Sixty-four pages of notes and a thirteen-page bibliographic essay are a testament to his research efforts and provide an excellent background for the reader.

The foundational role of the National Health Inventory conducted by the Roosevelt administration; the intricacies in the political maneuvering by Wilbur Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee in the run up to Medicare; and the pivotal role of the presidential task force headed by Hillary Clinton are highlighted through detailed evidence derived from Funigiello's archival work. As with his analytical approach throughout the book, he emphasizes in these three instances the importance of the strategic and tactical choices made by the policy actors. He does not see or seek deterministic explanations. He sheds light on the series of contingencies that repeatedly reconfigure themselves across over one hundred years of policy-making episodes.

In discussing the most recent failed attempt at comprehensive reform in the Clinton administration, Funigiello rightly points to the role of the media in framing the issues and the ambivalence of the middle class as obstacles that go beyond the long-standing political and structural factors. Although these are factors worthy of serious consideration, he underdevelops this section by not drawing more on such analysts as Marmor, Skocpol, and Jacobs. Such points as "middle-class voters were not overly troubled by the plight of the working poor and the uninsured" would have benefited from additional discussion as offshoots or new factors (303).

The combination of a solid grounding in scholarly research and a compelling writing style make Funigiello's book accessible and rewarding for academics, students, and interested members of the public.

Craig Ramsay

Ohio Wesleyan University

Classical Antiquity and the Politics of America: From George Washington to George W. Bush.

by John Fritch Classical Antiquity and the Politics of America: From George Washington to George W. Bush. Edited by Michael Meckler. Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006; pp. x + 231. $29.95 paper. American politics, education, and culture are greatly indebted to the ancient Greeks and Romans, who inspired many of the nation's greatest institutions, buildings, thinkers, and works of art. For centuries, schoolchildren were taught the speeches of Cicero, the governance of Plato, and the logic of Aristotle. Over time, the role of the classics in the educational system seemingly has waned. Yet, vestiges remain. Classical Antiquity and the Politics of America: From George Washington to George W. Bush offers a glimpse of the role that classical thought has played, and continues to play, in the United States. Its editor, Michael Meckler, expresses the volume's ambitious goal: "Yet once the intellectual landscape of American politics is stripped to its basic topography, the importance of the ancient Greeks and Romans becomes readily apparent. The essays in this volume attempt to reveal that importance, and how it has developed and changed from the Founders to the present day" (12). The book then examines the role of classical thought in a variety of social institutions, politicians, political ideologies, and American thinkers. As with any collection, some chapters contribute more directly to this stated goal than others. Overall, however, the quality of the book is quite high. The essays are interesting and readable, and remind us of the impact of Greek and Roman thought on American history. Scholars of argumentation and public address will find the first five chapters to be especially valuable. These chapters often discuss the importance of classical thought in the development of the American educational system. Each of the contributors argues that this system relied initially on a classical model of education. They also note the decreasing influence of classical models of education over time. Several themes here should interest scholars in argumentation and public address. First, many of the authors discuss the importance of rhetoric and public speaking in the classically-inspired curriculum of American education. They often point to rhetoric's place in the trivium of classical liberal arts and also stress the pragmatic importance of training in public speaking. For example, in "Classical Education in Colonial America," Ziobro writes: "One of the primary goals of a college education in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was the attainment of skill in public speaking, useful to both the minister in the pulpit and the politician in the assembly" (25). As Ziobro notes, the primary aim of the early colonial colleges was to train ministers and citizen-statesmen, for whom oratory was an essential skill. It is particularly refreshing to see scholars from other disciplines--classicists, historians, and medievalists--recognize the importance of rhetoric and public address in colonial education. Second, several authors discuss departures from a classical system of education in the United States, shifts that took place over an extended period of time. The contributors do not romanticize the role of rhetoric, nor do they demand a return to classical ideals. Rather, they explore the debates and policy decisions that prompted profound changes. Politicians and academic leaders participated in these debates, which often focused on the relevance of classical education for different groups of students. One of the most interesting treatments is Ronnick's "William Sanders Scarborough and the Politics of Classical Education for African Americans." Ronnick examines the debate over the purpose of education for African Americans from the early 1830s through the 1920s. She focuses on a dispute between Scarborough and Booker T. Washington, in which Scarborough advocated a classical education while Washington advocated a more practical education that focused on agriculture. America's historically black colleges and universities reveal the outcome of this debate. Ronnick quotes Scarborough's autobiography: "I see now, as the controversy grows concerning the classics, no young colored men of the immediate present who are even meditating on special classical study. It is a great mistake, as the race will find out, to leave this field to others with the breadth and culture obtainable in it" (67). Other authors observe that classical studies were abandoned in other institutions as well. Winterer's essay, "Classical Oratory and Fears of Demagoguery in the Antebellum Era," argues that national expansion and increased suffrage, together with de-emphasis of classical education, altered the nature of leadership in the U.S.: To connect with this passionate and largely unschooled citizenry attracted by the populism of the Democrats and Antimasons, a more direct style of public speaking emerged. Political oratory began to deviate sharply from the ornate, highly formal, Ciceronian 'periodic' style so prized in the revolutionary era. The new breed of political orator not only spoke in an unadorned, straightforward style, but he might also openly mock the classically imbued styles of an earlier era. (45) Meckler, in "The Rise of Populism, the Decline of Classical Education, and the Seventeenth Amendment," argues that the founding of land grant universities contributed to the decline of classical education. The rise of populism and the Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the direct election of senators, fostered establishment of land grant institutions that emphasized agriculture and engineering. Meckler notes that the number of college educated senators dropped dramatically following adoption of the amendment, making the Senate more willing to fund forms of education deemed to be more practical. One difficulty with these chapters is that they tend to focus on limited disputes within a larger context of change in education and American political thought. The individual cases tend to be treated as causes, or at least highly determinative, of sweeping changes in higher education and politics. Such an interpretation of history is problematic. The volume's concluding chapters also should be of interest to scholars in argumentation and rhetoric. The final three chapters examine the influence of classical thought on contemporary political debates. One examines how contemporary understandings of Thucydides shaped U.S. policy during the Cold War; another explores Robert Byrd's references to Roman emperors in arguing against the line item veto; the third compares the Bush administration to the philosophy of classicist Leo Strauss. Although their approaches differ, each seeks to identify how our understanding of Greek and Roman history and political thought shape contemporary issues. Interestingly, two authors argue that misunderstanding led to undesirable policy outcomes. In his chapter on Thucydides and the Cold War, Tritle contends: "Because history does not necessarily always teach lessons, the use of Thucydides in an exemplary sense is surely misleading.... That such comparisons were popular during the period does not make them valid" (140). More importantly, he notes, a fuller appreciation of Thucydides would have predicted that the U.S. would lose the Cold War. These final essays, while interesting and insightful, also illustrate some obvious dangers of applying classical studies to contemporary issues. I doubt that this book meets its ambitious goal, but it is interesting reading for those concerned about the classics and their relevance to American educational and political life. JOHN FRITCH University of Northern Iowa

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Publication Information: Article Title: Classical Antiquity and the Politics of America: From George Washington to George W. Bush. Contributors: John Fritch - author. Journal Title: Argumentation and Advocacy. Volume: 42. Issue: 4. Publication Year: 2006. Page Number: 227+. COPYRIGHT 2006 American Forensic Association; COPYRIGHT 2007 Gale Group

The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics of George W. Bush.

by Binoy Kampmark The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics of George W. Bush, Peter Singer (New York: Plume, 2004), 302 pages, $24.95 cloth; $14 paper. The literature on President George W. Bush's purported deceptions has reached a point where an anthology would not seem inappropriate. Such has been the nature of his administration's impact on U.S. domestic and international politics that the assembly line of criticism often resembles polemical pamphleteering rather than solid academic argument. This is not to suggest that such work is not valuable--Watergate was unraveled by committed journalists and morally concerned civil servants. But a piece that sets out to examine the Bush administration on its own terms, within the language of its own rhetorical framework, is to be commended. Has this aim been realized with Peter Singer's new work? The author's venture into this field is a change from previous projects. An Australian philosopher who pioneered animal ethics and has been touted as the "John Stuart Mill of the twenty-first century," Singer writes in the preface of the difficulty he faced in convincing colleagues of the merits of his task in "taking Bush seriously." But one is initially optimistic about this aim. Where the domestic and foreign policy of an administration rhetorically deploys the language of ethics, an assessment of the coherence of its claims is a sound project. In the first place, Bush campaigned in 2000 on a platform of "honesty." Many of his voters rated this requirement as essential to their preference; they were "disgusted" by the philandering and subsequent "Monica-gate" that marked Clinton's years in office (p. 218). As Bush's speechwriter David Frum had claimed, "The country could trust the Bush administration not to cheat and not to lie" (p. 214) and to conduct itself on the basis of fixed moral rules. Singer's overall verdict is damning, showing a general moral incoherence in Bush's positions on such issues as the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto treaty, helping AIDS victims in Africa, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the treatment of prisoners held as terrorist suspects and enemy combatants. Singer writes, "Whether he believes in the fine phrases and lofty rhetoric that he uses, or is consciously using it to win public support, it is clear that Bush has no real interest in the policy details needed to achieve the aspirations he has voiced" (p. 224). Even more troubling for Singer's purposes is that Bush's worldview does not have the moral fixity to which it appears to lay claim. In the final chapter of the book, Singer shows how Bush appeals to many different ethical systems--utilitarian, Christian, intuitive, and libertarian--depending on the issue at hand. This juggling and even instrumentalization of moral rhetoric has led, Singer shows, to some highly contradictory positions. As an example, take the various arguments used to justify the invasion of Iraq. (Let us set aside, for the moment, Singer's view that the Bush administration's misuse of CIA intelligence on the matter of Saddam's alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction in particular provided "the clearest demonstration of its gross misunderstanding of the moral requirements of honesty" [p. 217]). According to Singer, "Bush seemed to use a utilitarian argument in justifying the war in Iraq. Along with his argument about America's right to take preemptive action in its own defense, he suggested that the great good of liberating millions of Iraqis from Saddam's brutal tyranny justified the harm inflicted on a smaller number of Iraqis, even though many of them were innocent of wrongdoing" (p. 204). If, however, Bush were really a utilitarian, then wouldn't that view require him to do much more to help people dying of AIDS in Africa? Singer asks. Bush may be headed in the right direction, Singer admits, in directing a limited amount of resources to this suffering, but it is nowhere near enough. The case of Iraq points up another instance of moral disarray. Bush professes, according to a Christian ethic, to hold all human life to be sacred. This is the basis for his policies on abortion and stem-cell research. Yet the decision to invade Iraq--with the foreseeable consequence that innocent human life would be lost--would seem to contradict this ethic. Citing the teachings of Jesus and Paul as well as the Pope's condemnation of the war, Singer asserts, "On any reasonable interpretation of the Christian message, there was nothing especially Christian about his decision to go to war, and there is a strong case for saying it was distinctly un-Christian" (p. 207). As an assessment of whether Bush's performance as a president lives up to his own moral themes, Singer's book succeeds. One wonders, however, whether any president could be as morally rigorous as Singer seems to desire him to be. There is a complex range of factors motivating U.S. foreign policy; here, greater attention to the context of the decision-making process is important. Without contextualization, this ethics-conduct approach has limitations that narrow our understanding of why the president has actually undertaken particular courses of conduct. The simple characterization of moral inconsistency in a moral president may give us reason to worry, but it does not explain the deviances that govern such actions. Those deviances lie, in fact, in the realm of politics. Singer's own views help to illustrate this. There are some interesting moments in the book in which Singer steps away from the position of detached analyst to that of public intellectual, in particular in his advocacy of Security Council authorization for almost all interventions into sovereign states. Singer's own political vision comes into play. Even if we grant that Singer's position here adheres rigidly to his own moral views, we may be skeptical that an optimism in a Kantian federation of states as an alternative to Pax Americana is compelling or satisfying in the aftermath of Bosnia and Rwanda. The calculus of state interests and conflicts in the international system tends to be overlooked as a result. Singer himself admits that, on this score, legality and ethics are not one--there may be egregious cases in which states should act regardless of the law. In one sense, such reasoning brings us back to the fundamental intellectual dilemma facing advocates of humanitarian intervention, which requires a more coherent explanation beyond law and should seek, as Singer seems to suggest, a solution framed as an ethical exception. --BINOY KAMPMARK Cambridge University -1-

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Publication Information: Article Title: The President of Good and Evil: The Ethics of George W. Bush. Contributors: Binoy Kampmark - author. Journal Title: Ethics & International Affairs. Volume: 18. Issue: 3. Publication Year: 2004. Page Number: 115+. COPYRIGHT 2004 Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs; COPYRIGHT 2005 Gale Group

High Risk and Big Ambition: The Presidency of George W. Bush.

by Robert P. Watson High Risk and Big Ambition: The Presidency of George W. Bush. Edited by Steven E. Schier. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004. 292 pp. This is an important and challenging time in the nation's history. In 2001, the United States faced new threats from abroad from a new type of enemy, and the Bush administration responded by fashioning a new approach to foreign policy and national security readiness. For better or for worse, this is only a part of the major impact George W. Bush is likely to have on presidential politics for years to come. As such, High Risk and Big Ambition is a necessary and welcome examination of the "second" Bush administration. The book's release in 2004--at a time when the nation was gearing up for a presidential election that would grant Bush a second term or end his presidency--makes it a timely and useful tool for trying to make sense of the Bush record and put it into perspective. High Risk and Big Ambition also is part of a small but growing effort by scholars to provide an early assessment of the Bush presidency. To that end, the book joins other edited volumes released in the months leading up to the 2004 election, including those edited by Fred I. Greenstein (The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment); Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell (Considering the Bush Presidency); Bryan Hilliard, Tom Lansford, and Robert P. Watson (George W Bush: Evaluating the President at Midterm); and Jon Kraus, Kevin J. McMahon, and David M. Rankin (Transformed by Crisis: The Presidency of George W. Bush and American Politics). A strength of Schier's book is the quality of its contributors, who include several noted political scientists and presidential scholars as well as a Washington Post reporter and the president of Zogby International. For an edited volume, there is a surprisingly impressive degree of consistency in the quality and tone of the writing. The book features ten topical essays covering a wide array of important issues, from the politics of religion to "political warfare" during a time of war to Bush's relations with Congress. These chapters are organized under four general headings: Historical Perspectives, Popular Politics, Washington Politics, and Foreign and Economic Policy. A readable and helpful introduction and a solid concluding chapter by the editor help put the themes of High Risk and Big Ambition in perspective. As the title implies, the book has two underlying emphases that it uses to probe the Bush presidency. The first is "big ambition." The president and his administration ambitiously sought to fundamentally change the direction (and, as I would add, the nature) of the federal government. As Schier notes in the introduction, and as is impressively argued throughout the book, the Bush administration embarked on a new path to "create an alternative conception of government" (p. 2), one that departs from the policies and approaches of its predecessors and the power patterns of official Washington in order to put government to work for its own purposes. Bush is establishing a new regime, the authors argue, through the reconstruction of elements of the Reagan presidency, the establishment of Republican legislative majorities, and the "wooing of key elements of the electorate" such as suburbanites, rural Whites, Latino/as, and working-class males by emphasizing and issuing popular, symbolic statements, promoting tax cuts, and instituting an aggressive foreign policy and national security state. Whether Bush will be successful remains to be seen, but the second theme of the volume is "high risk." From this vantage point, the innovations the forty-third president has pursued are risky; historically, such innovators in the White House often have met with failure. A number of examples are provided throughout High Risk and Big Ambition to support both core arguments, and most contributors offer historical context for the subject under analysis, compare Bush with recent presidents, and explore the politics behind Bush's strategy and actions. The title of the book also might be used to express the intent and challenge facing the editor and contributors. It is obviously a challenge to produce a volume on a controversial president such as George W. Bush, let alone to do so while he is still in office. In addition to the uncertainties inherent in assessing a sitting president whose major initiatives are still unfolding and stirring passions, there is the question of maintaining one's objectivity. To an extent, Schier and the other contributors succeed. There are neither glaring partisan biases nor apparent agendas. Yet, I found the overall analysis and some of the chapters to be a bit soft on Bush by not offering more critical views of complex issues. This is not to say that High Risk and Big Ambition celebrates Bush or even that it is plagued by partisanship or bias. Yet, the numerous descriptions and extensive discussions of Bush "achieving surprising legislative success" (p. 1) and of his "political and policy successes" being "impressive" (p. 247) needed to be better balanced by, for example, the possibility that he has presided over a heavy-handed foreign policy; shortsighted, pro-business policy on the environment and energy; growing deficits; and few legislative accomplishments. The forty-third president is largely given a pass on what, at the time of this writing, many commentators, scholars, and roughly one half of the public see as a mishandling of the war in Iraq and the economy and divisive politicking at home and abroad. But let me not dwell on what could be misconstrued as a personal partisan critique. Rather, it must be said that the editor and contributors have done a commendable job with a challenging topic. High Risk and Big Ambition suffers only from a lack of probing analysis of the aforementioned concerns. Readers will find it to be extremely well written and easy to read. The chapters and arguments are clear and easy to follow, and the central arguments about the dramatic changes undertaken by the Bush administration are convincing. I could see the book making an excellent supplemental text for both upper-division undergraduate and graduate courses on the presidency. At the same time, it will prove to be a handy guide for a general audience seeking to learn more about the Bush presidency. I recommend High Risk and Big Ambition, with the qualification that, in the words of Bush 41, the analysis of 43 was "kinder and gentler" than expected. Robert P. Watson Florida Atlantic University -1-

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Publication Information: Article Title: High Risk and Big Ambition: The Presidency of George W. Bush. Contributors: Robert P. Watson - author. Journal Title: Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume: 35. Issue: 1. Publication Year: 2005. Page Number: 205+. COPYRIGHT 2005 Center for the Study of the Presidency; COPYRIGHT 2005 Gale Group

In His Father's Shadow: The Transformations of George W. Bush.

by Fred I. Greenstein In His Father's Shadow: The Transformations of George W, Bush. By Stanley A. Renshon. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004. 292 pp. It is not difficult to imagine an outcome of the 2000 election in which Al Gore garnered the modest number of additional votes in Florida he would have needed to win that state's electoral vote and gone on to become the 43d president of the United States. What difference would it have made for the course of events from January 20, 2001 to January 20, 2005 if Gore rather than George W. Bush had been president? It is likely that Gore, and most other conceivable occupants of the Oval Office, would have responded much as Bush did to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but it is highly unlikely, to take the most obvious example, that Gore, or most other possible chief executives, would have embarked on a preemptive war in Iraq. Because the war in Iraq and much else that resulted from the 2000 election bear the personal stamp of George W. Bush, the exercise in political psychology under review here calls for close attention, more so because its author, Stanley Renshon, is a practicing psychoanalyst as well as a political scientist who has written such works as The Psychological Assessment of Presidential Candidates (1998). In recounting Bush's pre-presidential years, Renshon relies heavily on Bill Minutaglio's excellent First Son: George W. Bush and the Bush Family Dynasty (1999). The younger George Bush, it will be remembered, was born in New Haven, Connecticut in 1946, where his war hero father was attending Yale, but brought up in the decidedly less upper-crust setting of Midland, Texas. At age seven, the younger George Bush had the wrenching experience of being informed that his three-year-old sister had died of leukemia. In his teens, Bush received a different kind of jolt. After attending Texas elementary schools, he was sent by his parents to the elite New England preparatory school his father had attended, and went on to spend his undergraduate years at Yale. In both schools, he was a lackluster student and had emotionally painful experiences. In prep school, Bush submitted an English composition describing his grief when his sister died. The instructor subjected the essay to harsh criticism for its awkward prose style, making no mention of its content. At Yale, Bush was told by the university chaplain that his father had been defeated by a "better man" in his recent unsuccessful campaign for the Senate. Bush returned to Texas with an abiding dislike for what he viewed as the arrogance of Eastern intellectuals, but with enduring friendships that served him well in business and politics. After Yale, Bush entered into what have been referred to as his "nomadic years," an extended period in which he drank to excess and got into alcohol-related scrapes. His life gradually came together with his marriage to the level-headed Laura Welch in 1977, the birth of their twin daughters in 1981, and his spiritual awaking in the early 1980s. On the morning of his fortieth birthday, Bush awoke with a fierce hangover and abruptly gave up drinking. In the decade that followed, he found business success as ownermanager of the Texas Rangers baseball team and went on to become governor of Texas and president of the United States. The nub of Renshon's psychological analysis is captured in his book's title and subtitle. Renshon's claim is that Bush's early fecklessness resulted from being "in the shadow" of his intimidatingly accomplished father, an interpretation that Renshon asserts but does not systematically defend. The book's subtitle refers to what Renshon argues are four transformations that have marked Bush's adult years (p. 3). The first two were in Bush himself. He changed from being "a young man trying (not always successfully) to find his place to a president who found his purpose" and later changed from being "a president whose administration was struggling" to one who "was profoundly transformed as a result of the terrorist attack on 9/11." The second two are transformations Bush seeks to impose on his political environment, although they also involved modifications in himself. During his time in the White House, Renshon argues, Bush has been transformed from being "a president with policy views, but no overarching vision, to a president trying to transform American political culture" and from being "a president with little knowledge of the world to a president trying to transform it." Few political observers would deny that Bush underwent a striking maturation early in middle age, or that his presidential leadership became dramatically more assertive in the wake of 9/11. However, the standing of the other pair of transformations to which Renshon refers is less self-evident. There is no question that Bush has sought to bring about significant domestic and international change. It is not obvious, however, that the term "transformation" provides a useful way to characterize his efforts. Indeed, Renshon implies in his final chapter that these would not take effect until the second Bush term that was not assured when his book went to press. In His Father's Shadow is not a full-blown psychobiography in the manner of the Alexander and Juliette George classic, Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House (1956). On Bush's early years Renshon summarizes what is related in greater detail in such secondary sources as Minutaglio's biography. Renshon does not closely examine the gubernatorial achievements that catapulted Bush to the Republican nomination or scrutinize in depth Bush's actions at such pivotal points in his presidency as 9/11 and the run-up to the Iraq war. Renshon's reliance on secondary sources is understandable, however, given the paucity of primary sources on sitting chief executives. Moreover, he is impressively resourceful in his use of one underappreciated primary source--the transcripts of a president's unscripted utterances that are compiled in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents. In poring through that compilation, Renshon has uncovered a number of nuggets, including an instructive disquisition by Bush to a group of university students in Russia on what makes for an effective leader. While his insights on the topic are not startling, they have a considered quality that provides us with a reminder that George W. Bush is not to be underestimated. "A leader can't do everything," Bush remarked.

 He must be willing to surround himself ... with smart, capable,
honorable people. A leader must be willing to listen, and
then ... must be decisive enough to make a decision and stick by it.
In politics, in order to lead, you've got to know what you believe.
You have to stand on principle. You have to believe in certain
values, and you must defend them at all costs.... You must set
clear goals and convince people of those goals and constantly lead
toward those goals. And finally, you've got to treat [the members of
your team] with respect.... By respecting people, they become better
members of the team and therefore give better advice and work toward
the same goal.

("Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session with Students at St.
Petersburg State University," St. Petersburg, Russia, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, May 25, 2002)

Renshon's book would have benefited from a more explicit organization and linear narrative. It tends to repeat interpretative points, rather than developing them in an orderly sequence of steps. The book would have profited as well from a fuller defense of its psychological interpretations, many of which are simply asserted. Here Renshon might have drawn on the example of George and George, who identify alternative interpretations of Woodrow Wilson's motivations and adduce evidence to choose among them. (See also George and George, Presidential Personality and Performance, 1998.) More attention to the weaknesses of Bush's leadership style also would have made the book more persuasive. As it is, the volume comes across as a celebration of Bush's strengths, often in terms that have the ring of idealization, as in Renshon's assertion that Bush's "psychology and mission" are marked by a "fierce and steely determination" (p. 203). Renshon might also have usefully considered a number of explicitly psychological claims that have been advanced about Bush. The mutually exclusive assertions have been advanced that Bush embarked on the Iraq war to vindicate his father and out of an oedipal need to do his father one better. It also has been alleged that Bush is what in the field of addictions therapy is referred to as a "dry drunk"--a former drinker who retains such traits of the alcoholic as impulsiveness, emotional volatility, and black-and-white thinking. A writer with Renshon's credentials should be uniquely qualified to assess such assertions. A final way the book could have been strengthened is with a fuller consideration of Bush's religious beliefs. At some points, Renshon seems even to minimize the importance of faith as a motivating force in Bush's life (e.g., p. 45). Yet Bush is conspicuous for his close ties with evangelical Christianity; he is a daily reader of the Bible and other religious works; and he has made so many assertions about the importance of religion to him that an entire Web site is devoted to the topic ("George W. Bush and Faith," beliefnet.com). Whatever the volume's limitations, In His Father's Shadow is a serious and instructive work. It is obligatory reading for anyone who seeks to take the measure of George W. Bush. Fred I. Greenstein Princeton University

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Publication Information: Article Title: In His Father's Shadow: The Transformations of George W. Bush. Contributors: Fred I. Greenstein - author. Journal Title: Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume: 35. Issue: 3. Publication Year: 2005. Page Number: 623+. COPYRIGHT 2005 Center for the Study of the Presidency; COPYRIGHT 2006 Gale Group

The George W. Bush Presidency: Initial Assessments.

by Gregory Domin The George W. Bush Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects. Edited by Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004. 357 pp. New Challenges for the American Presidency. Edited by George C. Edwards III and Philip John Davies. New York: Pearson Longman, 2004. 245 pp. The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment. Edited by Fred I. Greenstein. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003. 314 pp. Considering the Bush Presidency. Edited by Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004. 210 pp. Four recent works on the presidency of George W. Bush will interest scholars and students alike. These volumes cover a variety of subjects ranging from general leadership skills, leading the public and managing the press, managing Congress, organizing the White House, decision making, and implementing the war on terror. These four books offer the reader original perspectives evaluating George W. Bush's presidency and provide detailed and nuanced analyses of the president's accomplishments, failures, and frustrations at a critical time in our nation's history. Perhaps the central question that each raises is "what should we make of this president and this Presidency" (Campbell and Rockman, 352), so unlike the political personality and style of any other president/presidency? Three common denominators tie these works together and go a long way in answering this question: Bush's leadership style, his relationship with Congress, and his decision making/implementation of the war on terror. The first theme the works examine is Bush's leadership style, both at home and abroad, from the vantage point of the unusual circumstances that led to his election. Despite the fact that Bush did not have a public mandate to work with, he came to the Oval Office with assertiveness and resolve, evidenced by an early push for tax cuts and reforming public education with the No Child Left Behind Act. Bush's transition to a wartime president after the events of 9/11 forced the administration to refocus its agenda, calling into question the power of the presidency as well as its limitations. On both the domestic and foreign policy fronts, Bush was able to mobilize virtually every Republican lawmaker behind his policies as well as a handful of conservative Democrats. Many Democrats and members of the press underestimated Bush, which was of no small consequence, because his own "political style is flexible, but issue-driven and highly determined.... Moreover, he will compromise when he has to, but given the choice Bush will strive for results that are as close as possible to his policy aims" (Greenstein, xi). The chapters by Richard Neustadt, George C. Edwards III, Marc Landy, Barbara Sinclair, and Stephen J. Wayne in New Challenges for the American Presidency and Ivo Daadler and James Lindsay in The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment are both fascinating and groundbreaking when it comes to the questions of leadership and guiding beliefs. The second common denominator, which is closely related to the first, is their analysis of Bush's relationship with Congress. As several of the authors note, "Bush's relationship with Congress went through three phases during his first two years in office, and a fourth phase as a result of the 2002 midterm election" (Nelson, in Gregg and Rozell, 41). During the first phase, a time of united government, Bush's legislative agenda met with great success primarily by focusing on tax cuts and reforming education and by winning the confirmations of key Cabinet appointments such as Ashcroft, Powell, and Rumsfeld. Phase two of this relationship produced great frustration for the White House. Republicans had always worried about their one-seat majority in the Senate. Their fears were realized on "May 24, 2001 when Senator Jim Jeffords, announced he would become an Independent and caucus with the Democrats" (Nelson, in Gregg and Rozell, 148). Jeffords's decision gave the Democrats a 51-49 working majority in the Senate and allowed Senator Tom Daschle of South Dakota to become the new majority leader, thus focusing the Senate's agenda away from the president and on Democratic issues such as health care reform and a patients' bill of rights. Phase three of Bush's relationship with Congress generated limited success. The September 11th terrorist attacks improved Bush's approval ratings by some 40 points virtually overnight. Although presidents typically receive a "rally 'round the flag'" effect, it usually is short lived. However, the effects of this rally persisted for over a year as Bush's surge in popularity allowed him to win on most matters of national security for the remaining 16 months of the 107th Congress, including the USA PATRIOT Act and a bill creating a new Transport Security Administration within the Department of Transportation. It is important to note here, as many of the authors point out, that the president's high approval ratings in national security issues did not translate into "wins" for his domestic issues, which runs counter to Edwards's point that presidents with high approval ratings usually get what they want in both domestic and foreign policy. In Bush's case, there was little bipartisan congressional support for the president's agenda at home. Much of the domestic agenda the president signed into law were Democratic initiatives (e.g., the McCain-Feingold campaign finance reform legislation). The last phase comes in the aftermath of the 2002 midterm election. Bush experienced both unity and divided government in his first term, a rare circumstance, to say the least. With Bush's leadership and determination to become actively involved in the campaign, the Republicans actually made gains in both the House (six seats) and Senate (two seats), helping the party in candidate recruitment, fundraising, willingness to invest capital, campaigning, and domination of the national agenda (Nelson, in Gregg and Rozell, 152-53). This success allowed the president to expand his powers by pressing for Congress to act before the end of the session. Congress capitulated to the White House version of the Department of Homeland Security and cleared the way for several of Bush's judicial nominees. The chapters by John C. Frontier, Norman J. Ornstein, and Charles O. Jones in The George W. Bush Presidency: An Early Assessment; Nelson's chapter in Considering the Bush Presidency; and Bert Rockman's essay in The George W. Bush Presidency: Appraisals and Prospects are particularly well articulated and persuasive on this subject. The last common theme deals with decision making about and implementing the war on terror, which again relates to the overarching theme of leadership. Of particular importance are Daadler and Lindsay in the Greenstein volume and Richard Herrmann's (with Michael J. Reese) essay in Campbell and Rockman. These authors describe Bush as a "surprising foreign policy revolutionary," one who spoke out against an intrusive and interventionist foreign policy during the 2000 presidential campaign only to sign off on major military commitments in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the war on terror two years later. In several of the authors' views, Bush has gone from a multilateralist promising to work with U.S. allies in peacekeeping and nation-building efforts (at least during the 2000 campaign) to a unilateralist with hegemonic tendencies who is quickly straining U.S. relations with its allies around the world. The chapters by James P. Pfiffner, John Hart, G. Calvin Mackenzie, Richard M. Pious, and John Dumbrell in New Challenges for the American Presidency and Louis Fisher's chapter in Considering the Bush Presidency are also noteworthy for their great detail. Given its obvious implication, namely that the presidency of George W. Bush is groundbreaking and has something to teach us, these four works need to be read widely. They feature an impressive lineup of contributors who are at the top of their games. The essays also are well grounded, and their clear and relatively idiom-free prose makes them accessible to students interested in the study of the presidency. The volumes should be required reading for anyone interested in this most important subject. Gregory Domin Mercer University

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Publication Information: Article Title: The George W. Bush Presidency: Initial Assessments. Contributors: Gregory Domin - author. Journal Title: Presidential Studies Quarterly. Volume: 35. Issue: 1. Publication Year: 2005. Page Number: 197+. COPYRIGHT 2005 Center for the Study of the Presidency; COPYRIGHT 2005 Gale Group

Democrats, Not Bush, Best to Counter a Recession, Poll Says

By Matthew Benjamin

Jan. 25 (Bloomberg) -- Americans increasingly expect a recession this year and they're looking to Democrats more than President George W. Bush for a solution, according to a Bloomberg/Los Angeles Times survey.

The pessimism was shared widely, with more than two-thirds of those polled saying the economy is doing badly, up from 56 percent in December. That is the most negative sentiment since the poll began asking the question in 1997.

They view temporary tax breaks, which Bush and congressional leaders have agreed to include in a stimulus package, as the most effective way to boost the economy, according to the survey.

``If we have tax cuts we'll have a little more money and use it to spend elsewhere in the economy,'' said Lynn Jacques, 45, a poll participant and bookkeeper in Durham, Maine, who says gasoline prices are taking a toll on her budget. Although she's a registered Republican, Jacques isn't impressed by Bush's record. ``He just has not been good for the economy,'' she said.

Almost eight in 10 poll participants said a recession is likely this year, up from 71 percent in December, and only 16 percent now call a downturn unlikely. Almost four in 10 said a recession is very likely. The negative outlook spanned income groups and political affiliations. Nine in 10 respondents who have household income above $100,000 said they expect a slump as did a majority of Democrats, Republicans and independents.

Trust on Economy

By a margin of 51 percent to 29 percent, respondents to the survey said Democrats can handle the economy better than Bush.

The Jan. 18-22 poll of 1,541 adults nationwide had a margin of sampling error of plus or minus 3 percentage points.

The dismal outlook matches that in world financial markets, which have rallied after a broad sell-off at the start of this week. In response to warning signs of a slowdown, the Federal Reserve on Jan. 22 cut the target overnight lending rate between banks to 3.5 percent from 4.25 percent, the biggest single reduction to the benchmark rate since the Fed began using it as its principal monetary policy tool in about 1990.

While their outlook for the economy is pessimistic, two- thirds of Americans characterize their personal finances as very or fairly secure, and a majority expects to spend the same amount of money on purchases six months from now as they do today. While six in 10 respondents in households with income above $100,000 say they'll be spending the same amount, a quarter of them say they'll be spending less money six months from now.

Consumer Confidence

A primary fear among economists is that falling home values and consumer confidence will slow personal spending, which accounts for more than two-thirds of economic activity.

Asked who or what is to blame should the economy fall into recession, Bush was named more often -- by almost two in 10 -- than any other single factor. Fifteen percent blamed mortgage lenders who made risky loans. Economists tie much of the current economic malaise to rising defaults among homebuyers with sketchy or no credit history.

Trust on economic matters broke along party lines, with 83 percent of Democrats saying their party can better handle the economy and almost two-thirds of Republicans saying Bush. Independents by a margin of 51 percent to 25 percent said they trust Democrats.

``I've got a lot of years in me and it's been better in the past, better generally under Democrats,'' said Sidney Shrewscury, 66, a retired state policeman in Glen Daniel, West Virginia, who identifies himself as an independent.

Wrong Track

While Bush will be giving his State of the Union address Jan. 28, most Americans already have a firm view of the nation's state of affairs: 63 percent said the country is seriously off on the wrong track. The last time a majority said things were headed in the right direction was April 2003.

Asked what would be the most effective temporary measure to stimulate the economy, a plurality of respondents said a one-time tax rebate, and almost two in 10 said extending tax cuts that were passed in 2001 and 2003 and are set to expire by 2011. Sixteen percent named government spending on public works projects and one in 10 said tax cuts for businesses.

In a reversal from past polls, Americans now say returning money to taxpayers through tax cuts stimulates the economy more than an economic program focused on health and education spending. The survey was conducted when both Republicans and Democrats were proposing a temporary tax cut to spur growth. The deal worked out between the administration and Congress includes tax rebates for individuals and investment incentives for businesses.

``It will take cooperation and collaboration to fix the economy,'' said Pamela Nelson, a 54-year-old English teacher and survey participant from Minneapolis, Minnesota, who votes Democrat. ``Neither party has a corner on the answers.''

To contact the reporter on this story: Matthew Benjamin in Washington at mbenjamin2@bloomberg.net ;

Last Updated: January 24, 2008 19:00 EST

Stand With Honor

The tragic stubbornness of George W. Bush.

By William Saletan
Posted Thursday, Jan. 24, 2008, at 10:03 AM ET

President George W. Bush

Admiring portrayals of George W. Bush always expose, inadvertently, what's wrong with him. "Steady leadership," the theme of his 2004 re-election ads, was a case in point. Bush has always been too certain to admit error, too steady to turn the wheel when the road bent, and too preoccupied with principle to understand that principle wasn't enough. That was his downfall in Iraq. It's also why he pushed through his 2001 tax cuts even after the circumstances that originally justified them vanished.

Now the former White House aide who coordinated the formulation of Bush's stem-cell policy has published an account of how the president reached his decision. The reporting is new, but the story is familiar. Once again, the case for Bush is the case against him.

The account, published in Commentary, comes from Jay Lefkowitz, who served as a senior domestic-policy adviser to Bush until 2003. Lefkowitz calls Bush's 2001 deliberations "a model of how to deal with the complicated scientific and ethical dilemmas that will continue to confront political leaders in the age of biotechnology." He describes Bush swatting away a National Right to Life polling memo. The president "came to a moderate, balanced decision that drew a prudent and principled line," based not on polls but on "lengthy study and consultation with people of widely divergent viewpoints," Lefkowitz writes. That's Bush: serious, principled, indifferent to pressure.

full edition

http://www.slate.com/id/2182667/

George W Bush, White House told 935 lies after September 11

US President George W Bush and other top officials issued almost one thousand false statements about the national security threat from Iraq following the September 11 attacks, according to a study by two not-for-profit organisations.

The Associated Press reports the study, published on the website of the Centre for Public Integrity, concluded the statements “were part of an orchestrated campaign that effectively galvanised public opinion and, in the process, led the nation to war under decidedly false pretences”.

According to the study, 935 false statements were issued by the White House in the two years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks.

In speeches, briefings and interviews, President Bush and other officials stated “unequivocally” on at least 532 occasions that Iraq had links to al-Qaeda, or had weapons of mass destruction or was trying to get them.

“It is now beyond dispute that Iraq did not possess any weapons of mass destruction or have meaningful ties to al-Qaeda,” wrote the study’s authors Charles Lewis and Mark Reading-Smith.

“In short, the Bush administration led the nation to war on the basis of erroneous information that it methodically propagated and that culminated in military action against Iraq on March 19, 2003.”

The study found that President Bush alone made 259 false statements – 231 about weapons of mass destruction and 28 about Iraq’s links to al-Qaeda.

The other officials named in the study are vice president Dick Cheney, then-national security advisor Condoleezza Rice, then-defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld, then-secretary of state Colin Powell, deputy defence secretary Paul Wolfowitz and White House spokesmen Ari Fleischer and Scott McClellan.

“The cumulative effect of these false statements – amplified by thousands of news stories and broadcasts – was massive, with the media coverage creating an almost impenetrable din for several critical months in the run-up to war,” the study concluded.

“Some journalists – indeed, even some entire news organisations – have since acknowledged that their coverage during those pre-war months was far too deferential and uncritical. These mea culpas notwithstanding, much of the wall-to-wall media coverage provided additional ‘independent’ validation of the Bush administration’s false statements about Iraq.”
By staff writers
January 23, 2008 06:24pm
http://www.news.com.au/story/0,23599,23098129-401,00.html?from=mostpop#

George W. Bush Denies Secret Plot to Bomb Al-Jazeera, CBS, NPR, and CNN

by Kamal El-Din

George W. Bush Denies Secret Plot to Bomb Al-Jazeera, CBS, NPR, and CNN Unconfirmed sources report that the Bush White House has strongly denied that there was a secret plot to bomb news gatherings services and kill journalists in the Iraq theater of operations. The denial comes as reports of a secret memo written by the British detailing a conversation between Bush and Tony Blair indicates Bush wanted to bomb Al-Jazeera and other new services. White House officials deny that the plan was secret and contend their plan to bomb and kill journalists and news services in the area was well known. "There was never anything secret about our plans to kill journalists that were critical of the Bush Administration's actions in Iraq." Said White House spokesmen Ben Lion at an early morning press conference. "Our program to intimidate news services is well known and out in the open. We have no secrets on this one. We are not going to play favorites with American news services either. We don't care if you work for CNN, NRP, CBS or whomever; if you are a journalist in Iraq who is critical of the US then you are taking your life into your own hands." Media figures were not satisfied by the statements coming out of the White House and demanded the memo be released to determine if the plans were secret or not.. "Al-Jazeera is in the foremost of free form and democracy in the Arab world and therefore this news that we have heard is very concerning," said Wadah Khanfar, head of Al-Jezera . "So we demand a proper explanation and we would like to know the facts about this letter. If the US governments plans to bomb Al- Jazeera and the other news services was not secret, we want to know that." "Bomb NPR? It's absolutely no secret that the US government wants to bomb NPR." says NPR star, Ira Glass. "Everybody knows they want to bomb us, but dropping a 500 pounder in the middle of Chicago would be a really bad idea because of the bad press it would receive. I just don't see it happening, but I'm not moving out into the countryside. No way." Brussels-based International News Safety Institute (INSI) said in a statement that all satellite news channels except FOX had attracted the anger of the US Administration for their reporting of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. "Iraq is the most dangerous conflict for journalists in modern times with almost 100 news media staff dead in two and a half years. The US has control of the country and has a large interest in the way things are covered there." said ISNI director Rodney Pinder. "The US bombed Al-Jazeera's Baghdad bureau and it's Afghan bureau in Kabul, so the idea that it planned to bomb its headquarters in Qatar should not be a secret to anyone."

Read More at www.unconfirmedsources.com

George W. Bush: The movie

Alex Miller, editor@vaildaily.com
January 23, 2008

Since director Oliver Stone has announced his plan to make a film about the Bush presidency, it seems only fitting to take a stab at what this movie might look like. For a screenwriter, just imagine what you’d have to start trying to take into consideration when dreaming up the plot points and scene breakdowns:

• Sept. 11 and the bullhorn
• Florida recount and Supreme Court decision
• Extraordinary rendition; dark prisons; waterboarding
• Gonzales: I don’t remember recalling what I forgot
• Barney the Pet Goat
• Cheney and his shotgun
• Fired U.S. attorneys
• Walter Reed
• Plamegate
• Civilian contractors
• Iraq – trillion-dollar war
• Iran saber-rattling
• Korea
• Global warming denial
• Torture, Gitmo, Abu Ghraib
• Katrina
• Warrantless wiretapping
• Scooter Libby
• Jack Abramoff
• Cheney’s secret energy policy
• Enron buddies
• Terry Schiavo
• Budget deficits
• Medicare
• Rewriting/suppressing science
• Heckuva Job, Brownie
• Monica Goodling
• Imperial presidency
• Signing statements
• Getting the rest of the world to hate us

… and those are just the ones I can think of off the top of my head. Stone will have his work cut out for him as he tries to figure out what from the absolutely extraordinary list of Bush blunders will be best to hang a two-hour movie on. It’s hard to say whether the President, reading “Barney the Pet Goat” as the Twin Towers came down, is the best example of cluelessness — or is it the comment he made about trusting former U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales following that disgraceful appearance before Congress?

What’s the best scene to depict the imperial and secretive presidency: Cheney deciding U.S. energy policy behind closed doors with a bunch of petroleum executives, or would it be the White House directives to change and redact scientific documents to make global warming appear to be more theory than threat?

The bigger question is whether — by the time Stone’s film is shot, edited and open in theaters — anyone is going to want to relive any of this? It may seem difficult to believe with another year left to go (360 days and counting), but the day will come when George W. Bush leaves the Oval Office. In his wake, he leaves a legacy of destruction, both physical and moral, financial and ideological. While I used to routinely write columns denouncing the latest outrages from the Bush administration, I’ve found myself unable to muster the energy to even sum up small portions of the horror show the last seven years have been. I still believe Bush should be impeached and imprisoned, but since that appears unlikely, at the very least we have the solace that he will stop being the President after Jan. 20, 2009.

At that point, I don’t think you could pay me to go see a film about all this. More to the point, I’d suggest Stone focus his energy on film that details all the mopping up that will have to occur under the new president.

Sadly, the work to restore America and our place in the world may stretch so long into the future as to make the task best suited to writers of science fiction.

Alex Miller is responsible for the editorial oversight of the Vail Daily, Eagle Valley Enterprise and Vail Trail. He can be reached at 748-2920, or editor@vaildaily.com

George W. Bush: Fighting to the Finish

Sunday, January 27 at 8 p.m. ET

FOX News' Bret Baier was granted unprecedented access by George W. Bush as the president begins the final year of his extraordinarily consequential tenure.

This historic documentary — shot in high definition — takes you inside the Oval Office, to the president's Texas ranch, aboard Air Force One and into his private sanctums in the White House residence.

In a series of no-holds-barred interviews, the president talks openly of his aim to consolidate his mark on history, his "Freedom Agenda," the failure to catch Usama bin Laden, the role faith has played in his presidency and how he was inspired by the writings and deeds of Abraham Lincoln.

It's an unflinching, fair and balanced look at the nation's 43rd president — only on FOX News Channel.

A Liberals Plea: Don't Indict Karl Rove or George W. Bush...Yet.

by Chuck Terzella

A Liberals Plea: Don't Indict Karl Rove or George W. Bush...Yet. When I wrote about summertime and the impeachment of George W. Bush on June 16th, I was just kidding, I swear. I'm really too busy to continuously write about an impeachment of George Bush right now and will be until the middle of August. Therefore, I am calling on restraint from the Democratic Party when addressing the treasonous issue of President Bush's Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove and his naming of undercover CIA agent Valerie Plame. After all, Mr. Rove was not trying to destabilize the United States; at least not more than he's already done. He was only engaging in petty revenge against his political enemies. That's not a crime, that's just your run of the mill Republican politics. Ms. Plame's outing was more of a governmental friendly fire thing than out and out criminality. It would be better for all concerned...alright, it would be better for me...if any serious talk of putting Mr. Rove behind bars or impeaching his boss could be put off until September. I know earlier I said mid August, but I was hoping to get away with the wife for a couple weeks. Let's say just after the Labor Day weekend NPR and the Washington Post could start really hitting hot and heavy about the Plame affair, the Downing Street Memo and oh, I don't know, allegations that George W. Bush is a closet cross-dresser. Better yet, Laura is a closet cross-dresser. It has to be something that would alienate the Fundamentalists since it's obvious that lying, cheating, stealing and Preemptive Liberations don't bother them at all. In addition, Autumn is so much cooler and I can write out on the back deck without sweating my tail off with all the bugs and things. That would be nice, bringing down a government while the leaves turned red and gold and a cool breeze blew. Plus I love jackets and sweaters and while I typed I could occasionally glance over at my reflection in the French doors and see how great I look in suede. Perhaps those of you who don't know me might read this and think I'm a narcissistic, spoiled old man, demanding to slow the march of freedom in order to get some work done and a few weeks off. Right on all counts. But remember this, while you turkeys were polling George W. Bush in the high eighties for whacking Iraq my editorial colleagues and I were slaving away trying to have our little Texas Turncoat and his cronies drawn, quartered and ridden out of Washington on a rail. I've waited for four and a half years for this; you can sue me for wanting things done on my schedule for once. That said, I'm not sure who you call to get the scheduling done...is it Justice or the FBI or Hillary Clinton? If any of you out there know, please email me or respond to our letters to the editor link. Remember, I'm completely tied up till August fifteenth or twentieth. Wait, I have an idea. My birthday is in the beginning of October. If we could indict Bush by the first week of September, get the Saturday Massacre over by the twentieth at the latest, then I could get a resignation as a present and believe me, I'll never ask for anything ever again. I promise.

Read More at www.unconfirmedsources.com